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Error in legislation is common, and never more so than when the 
technology is galloping forward.  Let us not struggle to match an 
imperfect legal system to an evolving world. . . . Let us do what is 




¶1 In 1998, Congress passed the Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act in response 
to growing concerns over the dissemination of children‘s personal information over the 
Internet.
2
  The Act responded to the growing number of children online and addressed 
concerns over the harms that could arise if websites were not held accountable for the 
manner in which they collected and used children‘s personal information.3  Legislators 
sought to balance the benefits of the Internet as an educational tool, with the risks to 
children‘s privacy and safety that could come from the ease of sharing personal 
information online.
4
  In particular, legislators were concerned about the ability of children 
to meaningfully understand the harms that could arise from giving out their personal 
information over the Internet, such as abuses by online marketers, deceptive trade 
practices, and safety concerns.
5
 
¶2 The Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act and the Federal Trade Commission‘s 
(FTC) subsequent Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule promulgated in 2001 
(collectively, COPPA), set forth privacy standards for websites ―directed towards 
children‖ under the age of thirteen, including providing notice to the nature and use of 
information collected, and requiring websites to obtain ―verifiable parental consent‖ 
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before collecting or using children‘s personal information.6  Consistent with traditional 
regulatory standards, COPPA only applies to the collection of personal information from 
children ages twelve and under, as such children are thought to be more susceptible to 
deceptive practices and therefore in greater need of protection.
7
   
¶3 While the FTC has brought high-profile enforcement actions against websites that 
have failed to comply with COPPA regulations,
8
 commentators have criticized COPPA 
as ineffective.
9
  In particular, critics note that the practical effect of COPPA causes 
websites simply to ban users twelve and under.
10
  While in theory this strategy may sound 
effective, in reality it simply encourages age fraud and allows websites to bypass the 
burden of obtaining parental consent.
11
  
¶4 This Comment will argue that an overhaul of COPPA, providing for stricter 
regulation on collection and dissemination of personal information by websites 
themselves, is necessary to protect both children and teenagers from today‘s privacy 
threats.  Ten years after the passage of COPPA, the landscape of the Internet, particularly 
with regard to children and adolescents, has changed dramatically.  In 2009, children ages 
two to eleven represented 9.5% of all Internet users.
12
  Studies have shown that 93% of 
Americans between the ages of twelve and seventeen have access to the Internet and 61% 
browse the Internet daily.
13
   
¶5 The dramatic rise of Internet usage among children and teens creates additional 
opportunities for the misuse of personal information.  However, a new and important 
trend in how children and teens use the Internet has also developed in recent years.  This 
trend is the rise of social networking sites.   
¶6 Launched in 2003 and 2004, respectively, websites such as Myspace.com and 
Facebook.com are tremendously popular among adolescent Internet users.
14
  Recent 
surveys have found that 71% of teenagers have social networking profiles.
15
  Further, 
                                                 
6
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8
 See discussion infra Part III.A.  
9
 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
10
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11
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studies have found that up to a quarter of Internet users ages eight to twelve maintain 
social networking profiles.
16
  Advocacy groups have expressed concern that children and 
adolescents‘ privacy rights are subject to abuse on social networking sites.17  These 
concerns are compounded by the reality that many websites operate outside of COPPA 
regulations by making empty attempts to ban users under the age of thirteen.
18
 
¶7 COPPA must be revised so that children, teenagers, and parents are provided 
adequate notice of the uses of personal information online (especially with regard to third 
parties) and a meaningful opportunity to consent to those practices.   Reviewing COPPA 
through the lens of social networking sites, which dominate the interaction between 
today‘s young people and the Internet, shows that revisions are necessary to better protect 
the information of minors online, while balancing the interests of website operators as 
well. 
¶8 In Part I, this Comment will review the methods of online data collection and the 
FTC‘s characterization of the specific risks towards children that led to the passage of the 
Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act.  Part II will review the specifics of the 
Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act and Rule by discussing the legislative history 
and outlining specific objectives and aims by focusing on the statutory language.  Part III 
of this Comment will review the criticism that COPPA has been subject to in recent 
years, and conclude that despite high-profile enforcement actions, COPPA has been 
largely unsuccessful at reaching its true aims.  Part IV of this Comment will take a 
comprehensive look at how the Internet has changed since COPPA was enacted, and 
clarify the practice of behavioral targeting.  In particular, Part IV will focus on the need 
for comprehensive online privacy protection for all adolescents, not just for those under 
the age of thirteen, by illustrating the privacy issues raised by the proliferation of social 
networking sites.  Finally, Part V will examine proposed changes to online privacy laws 
and study proposals from children‘s advocacy groups and other commentators.  This 
Comment will argue that an overhaul of COPPA is necessary and suggest provisions for a 
new policy so that privacy laws may become more effective in protecting today‘s 
children and adolescents online.   
                                                                                                                                                 
166.  
16
 Children Signing Up for Under-Age Social Networking Profiles, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consumer/2010/03/children-signing-up-for-under-age-social-networking-profiles/ 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2010). 
17
 Letter from Angela J. Campbell & Coriell S. Wright, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Inst. for Pub. 
Representation, to Donald S. Clark, Secretary, FTC (Apr. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Children‘s Group COPPA 
Letter 2008], available at 
http://www.democraticmedia.org/news_room/letters/Letter_re_behavioral_advertising_comments 
(explaining the practical effect of COPPA to encourage websites to simply ban users under the age of 
thirteen); see discussion infra Part III.C.  
18
 Dorothy Hertzel, Don’t Talk to Strangers: An Analysis of Government and Industry Efforts to Protect a 
Child’s Privacy Online, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 429, 431–32 (2000). 
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I. DATA COLLECTION ONLINE AND THE ORIGINS OF COPPA 
A. An Overview of Data Collection Online 
¶9 There are two basic ways in which personal information is collected on the 
Internet: (1) a website user voluntarily submits information directly to a website, and (2) 
a website collects user information without the individual‘s knowledge.19   
¶10 Voluntary submission to a website is the most straightforward way to share 
information online; a user provides an e-mail address, phone number, home address, or 
other personal information to a website, either for registration purposes or commercial 
activity.
20
  The amount of information voluntarily submitted by users may encompass an 
even broader range of areas including hometowns, personal interests, favorite movies and 
television shows, educational background, even up to the minute information of a user‘s 
current whereabouts.
21
   
¶11 The second category of information collection is more passive.22  Technologies 
known as ―cookies‖ permit website operators to track user‘s online activities outside of 
their own websites.
23
  Cookies are small computer programs that are used by websites to 
store information such as username, passwords, and site preferences.
24
  Once a cookie is 
on a user‘s hard drive, it essentially acts as an electronic tracking device, which keeps a 
record of every website a user visits and then provides that information to the original 
website that placed the cookie.
25
   
¶12 Information is collected by websites in the form of cookies when users input 
information into search fields, and when users click on links and visit other websites, a 
practice referred to as ―clickstream data.‖26  Using these technologies, websites (or their 
advertisers) can learn much about their users, such as geographical location and Internet 
service provider, and can even learn of a user‘s interests and preferences by tracking web 
browsing patterns.
27
  All Internet users (both children and adults alike) are vulnerable to 
passive data collection online, yet remain largely naïve as to how often it occurs.
28
 




 Id. at 431–32 (―[S]ometimes a user voluntarily discloses personal information to a Web site.  For 
example, various Web sites require users to register in order to gain access or provide certain information 
in order to complete a purchase.  Web site may also provide incentives to the user to provide personal 
information.  Many users provide this information rather freely.‖).  
21
 See generally Usha Munukutla-Parker, Comment, Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, Privacy Concerns 
Related to Social Networking Services, Online Protection of Children and Cyberbulling, 2 I/S: J.L. & 
POL‘Y FOR INFO. SOC‘Y 627, 634–65, 637–38 (2006) (providing an overview of the types of personal 
information collected on social networking websites).  
22
 For a succinct description of how passive data collection and cookies work in practice, see In re 
DoubleClick Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  See also Andrew Hotaling, Comment, 
Protecting Personally Identifiable Information on the Internet: Notice and Consent the Age of Behavioral 
Targeting, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 529, 548–49 (2008). 
23
 Hotaling, supra note 22, at 534–36.  
24
 Id. at 534 n.32. 
25
 Hertzel, supra note 18, at 431–32 (―By leaving an ‗electronic marker‘ at each site or page that they visit, 
the user unknowingly provides information to the Web site that can be stored and reused.  Unbeknownst to 
the user, a Web site can then ‗know‘ [a] users‘ e-mail addresses, the names of their browsers, the type of 
computer they are using, and the universal resource locator (URL), or Internet address, of the site from 
which they linked to the current site.‖). 
26
 Hotaling, supra note 22, at 534–35; In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502–05.  
27
 Hotaling, supra note 22, at 531–32. 
28
 Hertzel, supra note 18, at 432. 
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B. Internet Privacy Concerns and Children: The Need for COPPA 
¶13 In June 1998, a study was completed by the FTC that concluded by calling for 
greater incentives for self-regulation and better implementation of privacy policies among 
commercial websites.
29
  In the study Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, the FTC 
outlined core traditional fair information principles, designed to ensure that collection, 
use, and dissemination of personal information are consistent with consumer interests.
30
   
¶14 As summarized by the FTC, consumers must be given ―notice of an entity‘s 
information practices[,] . . . choice with respect to the use and dissemination of 
information collected from or about them[,] . . . access to information about them 
collected and stored by an entity,‖ and data collectors must ―take appropriate steps to 
ensure the security and integrity of any information collected.‖31  While the FTC was 
concerned about the mere collection of personal information online, their greater concern 
seemed to be how such information is used by websites after it is obtained. 
¶15 The FTC found that based on the emergence of the online market as a powerful 
platform for commerce, Congress needed to take steps to protect consumer personal 
information from misuse by web operators.
32
  In the late 1990s, electronic commerce was 
a booming industry; with the rise of the online market, the FTC expressed concern that 
websites would not adequately protect consumers‘ information to ensure privacy.33  
During the early years of e-commerce many consumers were wary of sharing private 
information online, especially given the risks of identity theft, fraud, or the unauthorized 
dissemination of private information to third parties.
34
  
¶16 While adults were apprehensive about the security of their personal information 
online, such concerns were multiplied when it came to children and the Internet.  
According to 1997 census data estimates, 22.6% of children and adolescents ages three to 
seventeen had Internet access, and participated in a wide range of activities including 
video games, message boards, chat rooms, and interactive homework assistance.
35
  The 
FTC found that children who went online were submitting personal information to 
websites in a wide range of capacities without the knowledge or approval of their 
parents.
36
   
¶17 Even in 1997, the opportunities for children to share personal information online 
were vast.  A child could voluntarily submit personal information to a website (for 
example, by registering for a contest or signing up for an e-mail ―pen pal‖ service), or a 
child could reveal personal information by participating in an online chat room or 
interactive message board.
37
  Additionally, a child could indirectly provide a website with 
personal information (such as web browsing practices) through the use of cookies.
38
  
                                                 
29




 Id. (emphasis added). 
32
 Id. at 3; see also Children‘s Group COPPA Letter 2008, supra note 17.  
33
 PRIVACY ONLINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.   
34
 Id.  
35
 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER USE IN THE UNITED STATES: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 6 (1997), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p20-522.pdf; see generally PRIVACY ONLINE REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 12–13 (providing an overview of children‘s online behaviors).  
36
 PRIVACY ONLINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4–5.   
37
 Id. at 4.  
38
 Id. at 4–5. 
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¶18 The collection of personal information from children online presented serious and 
legitimate concerns because of: (1) ―the vulnerability of children,‖ (2) ―the immediacy 
and ease with which information can be collected from them,‖ and (3) ―the ability of the 
online medium to circumvent the traditional gatekeeping role of the parent.‖39  Primarily, 
the FTC was concerned with the safety risks that could arise from children sharing their 
personal information online.  By 1997, the FBI and Department of Justice had begun to 
take a more proactive role in alerting the public to the risks of meeting sexual predators 
online.
40
  An online chat room could be a great resource for a child seeking homework 
help or wishing to communicate with her peers, but could also serve as a place free of 
parental protection, providing opportunity for a child to give her personal information to 
a dangerous stranger.
41
   
¶19 In addition to safety concerns, the FTC also was concerned with the collection of 
personal information from children by commercial websites seeking such information for 
marketing purposes.
42
  Children traditionally are thought to lack the wherewithal to 
protect themselves against marketing abuses.
43
  Studies have shown that children under 
the age of twelve often have difficulty distinguishing commercial speech from 
noncommercial speech.
44
  For example, the FTC was concerned about a children‘s 
website asking for personal information as a prerequisite to playing an online game, or as 
part of an online contest.  As such, a child would be likely to disclose information to 
websites, but lack the developmental capacity to fully understand the consequences of 
such disclosure, such as widespread dissemination to third party advertisers.
45
  
¶20 Parents, in their traditional roles, can shield children from such harms; however, 
given the free-flow of information online, parents may have a more difficult time 
regulating children‘s behavior and protecting them from abusive marketing practices.46  
An FTC survey revealed that 97% of parents believe that a website should not have the 
power to sell their child‘s information to a third party, and 72% objected to the collection 
of their child‘s name or address in any capacity.47   
¶21 In a comprehensive study of websites directed towards children, the FTC found that 
89% of websites collected personal information directly from children, while a mere 10% 
of such sites offered any mechanisms for parental control over the collection and use of 
such information.
48
  The FTC reviewed a sample of websites directed towards children, 
finding that sites were asking for children‘s e-mail addresses, home address, age, gender, 
hobbies, and other personal information, while only 48% disclosed their uses for such 
                                                 
39
 Id.  ―[Children‘s] status as a special, vulnerable group is premised on the belief that children lack the 
analytical abilities and judgment of adults.  It is evidenced by an array of federal and state laws that protect 
children, including those that ban sales of tobacco and alcohol to minors, prohibit child pornography, 
require parental consent for medical procedures, and make contracts with children voidable.  In the specific 
arenas of marketing and privacy rights, moreover, several federal statutes and regulations recognize both 
the need for heightened protections for children and the special role that parents play in implementing these 
protections.‖  Id. at 12. 
40




 PRIVACY ONLINE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4–5. 
43
 Children‘s Group COPPA Letter 2008, supra note 17. 
44






 Id. at 6.  
48
 Id. at 31–37. 








¶22 Based on these findings, the FTC recommended that Congress pass comprehensive 
legislation allowing for a greater parental control over the collection and dissemination of 
children‘s personal information.51  Considering the principles of fair information practice, 
the FTC argued that it is a parent‘s role to have notice, access, and choice as to how their 
children‘s personal information is used and collected.52  The FTC distinguished between 
children ages twelve and under and children over the age of twelve, reasoning that the 
former class would be particularly vulnerable to overreaching by online marketers and 
subject to graver safety risks.
53
  In limiting the application of COPPA to children under 
the age of thirteen, the FTC argued that adolescents and other consumers could be 
protected from the misuse of personal information under the baseline powers of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits any ―unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce.‖54   
II. THE LAW ITSELF: WHAT IS COPPA AND WHAT DOES IT DO? 
A. Authority from Congress: Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
¶23 In response to the FTC‘s Report, Congress introduced the Children‘s Online 
Privacy Protection Act in 1998, which granted the FTC the authority to create a rule 
responding to online privacy concerns that would give parents a greater role in the control 
of their children‘s personal information.55  The Children Online Privacy Protection Act 
sought to address the FTC‘s concerns and requests in the Privacy Online report.  As 
summarized by co-sponsor Senator Richard Bryan, the objectives of the Act were:  
 
(1) to enhance parental involvement in a child‘s online activities in order 
to protect the privacy of children in the online environment;  










 Id. at 46.  The FTC argued that children and adolescents over the age of thirteen needed less formalized 
privacy protection; however, Congress‘ final COPPA Rule only granted protections for children under 
thirteen.  Id.  
54
 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1961); Janine Hiller et al., Pocket Protection, 45 
AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 429 (2008).  The FTC originally suggested that the law apply in stages to children 
younger than seventeen, but backtracked on this position by the time COPPA was before Congress.  
Arguably, this illustrates at least an initial awareness by the FTC that its baseline provisions against 
deceptive practices did not directly address the specific problems of online privacy for both children and 
adolescents.  
55
 144 CONG. REC. S8482–83 (daily ed. July 1, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bryan) [hereinafter Sen. Bryan 
Statement] (―If a child answers a phone and starts answering questions, a parent automatically becomes 
suspicious and asks who they are talking to.  When a child is on the Internet, parents often have no 
knowledge of whom their child is interacting.  That is why we are introducing legislation that would 
require the FTC to come up with rules to govern these kind of activities.‖).  As the FTC is an administrative 
agency, before it could implement a children‘s privacy protection law that carried the force and effect of 
law, Congress needed to pass a statute granting authority.  Therefore, the Children‘s Online Privacy 
Protection Act is the delegation of authority from Congress, while the Children‘s Online Privacy Protection 
Rule is the actual FTC law under which enforcement actions are brought and fines for non-compliance may 
be levied.  See generally Hiller et al., supra note 54, at 428. 




(2) to help protect the safety of children in online for a such as chat rooms, 
home pages, and pen-pal services in which children may make public 
postings of identifying information;  
 
(3) to maintain the security of children‘s personal information collected 
online; and  
 





¶24 The Act, which defines children as those under the age of thirteen, asks the FTC to 
implement a rule to protect privacy online in accordance with several key principals.
57
  
Owners of websites directed towards children are required to ―provide notice on the 
website of what information is collected from children, how the operator uses such 
information, and the operator‘s disclosure practices for such information.‖58   
¶25 In addition, Congress requires website owners to ―obtain verifiable parental consent 
for the collection, use or disclosure of personal information from children.‖59  Under the 
Act, the FTC is granted sole administration and enforcement powers.
60
 
B. The FTC’s Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule 
¶26  Under the authority delegated by Congress, the FTC implemented the Children‘s 
Online Privacy Protection Rule, which became effective in April of 2000.
61
  The Rule has 
many highlights that are necessary to review in order to fully comprehend its intended 
effect. 
1. Defining ―Personal Data‖ 
¶27 First, the Rule defines the collection of personal data from children.  Collection of 
data under the Rule includes data submitted directly by children from sources such as 
message boards and chat rooms as well as data received passively from devices such as 
online cookies.
62
  Examples of personal information include first and last name, home 
address, e-mail or any other online contact information, phone number, social security 
number, or the combination of a photograph of an individual coupled with the person‘s 
last name.
63
  The Rule also prohibits a website from selling, releasing, or in any way 
sharing personal information with a third party, and prohibits a website from making 
personal information collected from a child publicly available online.
64
 
                                                 
56
 See Sen. Bryan Statement, supra note 55; Danielle Garber, COPPA: Protecting Children’s Personal 
Information on the Internet, 10 J.L. & POL‘Y 129, 154 (2001) (discussing legislative intent).  
57
 15 U.S.C.A § 6502 (2006). 
58
 § 6502 (B)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added).  
59
 § 6502 (B)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).  
60
 15 U.S.C.A. § 6505 (a) (2006). 
61
 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2009). 
62
 § 312.2.  
63
 § 312.2.   
64
 § 312.2 (a)–(b). 
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2. Notice 
¶28 The Rule requires a website to provide effective notice as to its data use and 
collection policies with regard to children, and outlines specifics as to when such notice 
will be deemed proper.
65
  For example, such policies must be posted in links that are 
―clearly labeled‖ and placed in a ―clear and prominent place and manner‖ on the home 
page.
66
  The policy must contain information specifically stating the contact information 
of website operators collecting and maintaining information, whether the information is 
disclosed to third parties, and how such information is used.
67
  
¶29 Additionally, adequate notice must contain the name, address, telephone number, 
and e-mail address of all operators collecting or maintaining personal information from 
children through the website.
68
  The notice requirements also mandate that a website 
―make reasonable efforts, taking into account available technology‖ to inform parents of 




3. Verifiable Parental Consent 
¶30 The crux of COPPA‘s protections is the requirement that website operators obtain 
―verifiable parental consent‖ before collecting information from children.70  The Rule 
states: ―An operator is required to obtain verifiable parental consent before any 
collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal information from children.‖71   
¶31 The Rule outlines several proposed mechanisms for obtaining such consent, in light 
of available technology.  Some suggested methods include: providing a consent form to 
be signed by parents and then returned to website operators by fax; requiring a parent to 
use a credit card in a transaction, with the reasoning that children under the age of 
thirteen do not have access to credit cards; having a parent call a toll-free number staffed 
by personnel trained to recognize voice difference between children and adults; and using 
digital certificates based on available technology to verify age.
72
  The Rule creates an 
exception to parental consent in instances where a website operator is collecting personal 




¶32 Further, the Rule enacts what is referred to as a ―sliding scale‖ of consent; that is, 
the efforts that website operators must take to ensure that parental consent is legitimate 
are proportional to the degree to which the personal information will be used.
74
  Under 
                                                 
65
 16 C.F.R. § 312.4 (b) (2010).  
66
 § 312.4 (b)(1)(ii).  
67
 § 312.4 (b)(1)(i)–(iii) (overview of proper placement of notice); § 312.4 (b)(2)(i)–(iii) (overview of 
content of proper notice).  
68
 § 312.4 (b). 
69
 § 312.4 (c). 
70
 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (a) (2010).  
71
 § 312.5(a)(1).  
72
 § 312.5(b)(2). 
73
 § 312.5(c)(1)–(4) (providing that other exceptions to parental consent include when purpose of collection 
is a one-time correspondence, and where the collection of such data may be necessary to protect child‘s 
safety). 
74
 FTC Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888, 59,908 (Nov. 3, 1999) (codified at 
16 C.F.R. § 312).   
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this test, e-mail verification of parental consent is justified when the website operator 
does not provide information to third parties, but a ―higher‖ method of consent (such as a 
print and mail form) would be necessary for activities that could pose a greater risk to 
children.
75
  The FTC originally intended the ―sliding scale‖ rule to act as a temporary 
measure until ―secure electronic methods become more widely available‖ (which, as 
discussed below, was far too optimistic).
76
   
¶33 The ―sliding scale‖ addressed concerns over e-mail‘s viability as a means to obtain 
consent.  While e-mail is certainly the most efficient and inexpensive means of obtaining 
consent, it is also the form most vulnerable to abuse or falsification.
77
  At the time of the 
Rule‘s enactment in 2000, the FTC believed that technological advances would soon 
provide for more cost efficient methods of age-verification online.
78
  The sliding scale 
was meant to serve as a temporary measure, which would be reviewed and overturned in 
a matter of years.
79
 
4. Miscellaneous Provisions 
¶34 The Rule grants parents the right to review any personal information submitted by 
their children and requires websites to comply with any requests to provide such 
information.
80
  It also requires website operators to affirmatively establish procedures to 
protect the confidentiality of children‘s personal information collected.81  The Rule 
explicitly prohibits a website from conditioning a child‘s participation in the activities of 
the site (for example, games, clubs, or contests) on providing more information than is 
reasonably necessary to engage in the activity.
82
  In an effort to give websites additional 
incentives to comply with COPPA, the Rule outlines ―safe harbor‖ provisions, where a 
website operator will be in compliance with COPPA if it follows approved industry 
guidelines for self-regulation.
83
  Industry guidelines must be pre-approved by the FTC 
before receiving safe harbor protections.
84
 
                                                 
75
 FTC Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,908. 
76
 FTC Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,908; see infra Part III.B. 
77
 Hiller et al., supra note 54, at 434.  
78
 Id.  
79
 FTC Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,888 (―A number of electronic 
products and services which could also be used to verify a parent‘s identity and obtain consent are currently 
available or under development.‖).  
80
 16 C.F.R. § 312.6 (2010). 
81
 § 312.6(a)(1)–(3). 
82
 16 C.F.R. § 312.7 (2010).  
83
 16 C.F.R. § 312.10.  In order to classify as a safe harbor, regulations must be approved by the FTC and 
are subjected to periodical reviews.  Id.  Currently, four organizations have received FTC safe harbor status 
under COPPA.  FTC, Safe Harbor Program Application, 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/childrens_shp.html (last visited May 31, 2010).  
84
 16 C.F.R. § 312.10.  Four organizations have been approved under this safe harbor provision: the 
Children‘s Advertising Review Unit, a subset of the Better Business Bureau; E.S.R.B. Privacy Online, part 
of the Entertainment Software Ratings Board; TRUSTe, an online privacy service; and Privo Inc., a similar 
privacy service.  FTC, Safe Harbor Program Application, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiati 
ves/childrens_shp.html (last visited May 31, 2010).  To be approved by the FTC, participants must 
maintain self-regulatory guidelines including: (1) a requirement that participants in the safe harbor program 
implement substantially similar requirements that provide the same or greater protections for children as 
those contained in the Rule; (2) an effective, mandatory mechanism for the independent assessment of safe 
harbor program participants' compliance with the guidelines; and (3) effective incentives for safe harbor 
program participants' compliance with such guidelines.  See id.  
Vol. 5:2] Lauren A. Matecki 
379 
¶35 COPPA establishes an elaborate regulatory scheme, envisioning an Internet where 
websites directed towards children under the age of thirteen do not engage in any 
information collection practices without parental consent and involvement.
85
  While it 
seeks to provide uniform guidelines as to the standards website operators must follow, the 
Rule leaves many questions unanswered.  While COPPA is intended to apply only to 
websites ―directed towards children,‖ it does not attempt to define the term further.  
Website operators must determine for themselves whether or not they are likely to be 
found ―directed towards children,‖ and therefore whether they will be bound by 
COPPA‘s requirements.86   
¶36 The Rule contemplates various methods for obtaining parental consent, but it does 
not state which method would be ideal, nor does it provide a way for websites to gauge if 
another standard would be sufficient.
87
  On the surface, COPPA embodies the privacy 
scheme contemplated by the FTC—the burden of protecting children‘s personal 
information is seemingly shared between the website operators and parents.  However, 
there have been significant discrepancies between the COPPA Rule‘s literal requirements 
and its enforcement and implementation in practice.
88
   
III. ENFORCEMENT, REVIEW, AND CRITICISM OF COPPA IN PRACTICE  
A. Noteworthy COPPA Enforcement Actions 
¶37 Under the Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act, Congress delegated all 
enforcement duties to the FTC, giving it the power to bring forward adjudicatory actions 
against websites and the power to levy fines for violations.
89
  Since COPPA was enacted, 
there have been several high-profile enforcement actions against websites found in 
violation.  A review of these enforcement actions demonstrates two key points.  First, the 
FTC‘s strategy in seeking enforcement has shifted from targeting sites that were merely 
not compliant with COPPA to seeking enforcement against sites that attempted to meet 
COPPA‘s standards but were deemed ineffective.  COPPA‘s statutory language makes 
predicting when such enforcements will be levied difficult for website providers.  
Second, COPPA enactments against social networking sites illustrate a double-bind for 
these websites when it comes to the problem of age-falsification, as both websites that 
ignore the reality of age-falsification and websites that acknowledge underage users face 
enforcement.  
¶38 The first civil penalty cases under COPPA were settled in April 2001 against three 
website operators for failing to obtain parental consent before collecting personal 
information from children under the age of thirteen.
90
  The defendant website operators 
                                                 
85
 See Hiller et al., supra note 54, at 442. 
86
 Wolcott, supra note 11. 
87
 Hiller et al., supra note 54, at 433. 
88
 Anita Allen, Minor Distractions: Children, Privacy and E-Commerce, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 751, 770 
(2001); see discussion infra Part III.B. 
89
 15 U.S.C.A. § 6505(a) (2006) (―This chapter shall be enforced by the Commission under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.‖).  
90
 Press Release, FTC, FTC Announces Settlements with Web Sites That Collected Children's Personal 
Data Without Parental Permission (Apr. 19, 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/04/girlslife.shtm. 
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collectively ran the website Girlslife, a site targeted at girls ages nine to fourteen and 
offering pen pal opportunities, advice columns, online contests, and message boards.
91
   
¶39 The FTC‘s enforcement against Girlslife focused on strict non-compliance with 
COPPA‘s provisions.  The FTC found that the operators collected information from users 
under the age of twelve, such as their first and last names, e-mail addresses, and 
telephone numbers, without obtaining parental consent.
92
  Further, site operators failed to 
provide notification of their collection practices, and sold the personal information of 
underage children to third parties without notice or obtaining parental consent.
93
   
¶40 In the next wave of COPPA enforcement, websites that attempted to comply with 
COPPA were targeted for ineffectively implementing its provisions.  In 2003, the FTC 
levied civil penalties of $100,000 and $85,000 against Mrs. Fields Cookies and Hershey‘s 
Foods, respectively, for COPPA violations.
94
  The enforcement action against Hershey‘s 
marked the first time the FTC deemed a website‘s methods of obtaining parental consent 
insufficient, finding that Hershey‘s method of obtaining consent was not ―reasonably 
calculated to ensure that the person providing consent was the child‘s parent.‖95  
Hershey‘s had instructed children under the age of thirteen to have their parents fill out 




¶41 In September 2006, the FTC settled with UMG Recordings for a civil penalty of 
$400,000 for collecting personal information on children under the age of thirteen, and 
additionally for failing to maintain an adequate privacy policy.
97
  UMG requested users‘ 
birthdays before allowing them to enter the website, but did not take any steps to secure 
parental consent when users indicated they were under the age of thirteen.
98
  UMG then 
collected personal information from users including full name, birthday, home address, 
and e-mail address despite having actual knowledge that some users were under thirteen 
and therefore entitled to COPPA protections.
99
  The enforcements against Hershey‘s and 
UMG illustrate the difficulty for website providers in interpreting COPPA‘s vague 
statutory requirements as to what actually constitutes sufficient parental consent. 
¶42 In recent years, the FTC has targeted social networking sites for COPPA violations. 
In September 2006, the FTC brought an enforcement action against the social networking 




 Id.  
93
 Id.  In 2001, enforcement actions were taken against Lisa Frank Inc., which collected addresses and 
phone numbers from girls under the age of twelve without parental consent, and against the website 
Jollytime, which collected e-mail addresses and home addresses from children under the age of thirteen and 
failed to obtain parental consent despite a stated privacy policy which claimed otherwise.  Press Release, 
FTC, Web Site Targeting Girls Settles FTC Privacy Charges (Oct. 2, 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/10/lisafrank.shtm; Press Release, FTC, Popcorn Company Settles FTC 
Privacy Violation Charges (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/popcorn.shtm. 
94
 Press Release, FTC, FTC Receives Largest COPPA Civil Penalties to Date in Settlements with Mrs. 
Fields Cookies and Hershey Foods (Feb. 27, 2007), available at 
www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/02/hersheyfield.shtm.  
95
 Id.  
96
 Id.  
97
 Press Release, FTC, UMG Recordings, Inc. to Pay $400,000, Bonzi Software, Inc. to Pay $75,000 to 





 Id.  
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website Xanga for $1 million in civil penalties—the largest COPPA fine to date.100  
According to the FTC‘s complaint, Xanga allowed users under the age of thirteen to 
create profiles containing large amounts of personal information without first obtaining 
verifiable parental consent.
101
  New users to Xanga seeking to create an account were 
prompted to check a box indicating whether or not they were over the age of thirteen.
102
  
Users under the age of thirteen received a message stating to ―come back on your 
thirteenth birthday,‖ while users who did not initially check the box received a message 
stating, ―[y]ou must check the box below to certify you are at least thirteen years old.‖103  
An estimated 1.7 million users under the age of thirteen created user accounts on Xanga 
by checking the over thirteen box following this prompt.
104
   
¶43 The FTC found Xanga in violation of COPPA for obtaining user information from 
these accounts without any efforts to obtain parental consent and for specifically using 
the information in underage accounts to tailor advertisements.
105
  The FTC found 
Xanga‘s attempt to screen out underage users inadequate, and, therefore, many children 
under thirteen were allowed to submit personal information without parental consent.
106
  
In addition to the $1 million civil penalty, the FTC‘s enforcement action required Xanga 
to provide links to FTC consumer education materials and to publish FTC safety tips for 
social networking.
107
   
¶44 In January 2008, the FTC charged the social networking site Imbee.com with 
COPPA violations.
108
  Imbee was promoted as a social networking website specifically 
designed for kids ages eight to fourteen.
109
  According to the FTC, Imbee enabled more 
than 10,500 children to create Imbee websites without properly obtaining parental 
consent.
110
  The website collected a parent‘s e-mail address, and would not complete the 
registration of the children‘s profile without consent.111  However, if the parent did not 
respond to the registration request, Imbee would not delete previously obtained children‘s 
information.
112
  The FTC charged Imbee a $130,000 civil penalty for its COPPA 
infractions.
113
   
                                                 
100
 Press Release, FTC, Xanga.com to Pay $1 Million for Violating Children‘s Online Privacy Protection 
Rule (Sept. 7, 2006) [hereinafter FTC Xanga Enforcement], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/09/xanga.shtm.  
101





 FTC Xanga Enforcement, supra note 100; Complaint of FTC at 6, United States v. Xanga.com, Inc., No. 
06-6853 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623073/060907xangacomplaint.pdf.  
104
 Id.  
105







 Press Release, FTC, Imbee.com Settles FTC Charges Social Networking Site for Kids Violated the 
Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act; Settlement Includes $130,000 Civil Penalty (Jan. 8, 2008) 
[hereinafter Imbee Settlement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/01/imbee.shtm.  
109
 Id.  
110
 Id.  
111
 Id.  
112
 Id.  
113
 Id. 
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¶45 The Imbee and Xanga enforcement actions prove the difficulty for a website to 
ensure complete COPPA compliance.  The nature of these COPPA enforcements makes 
it even harder for websites to predict when measures to ensure age verification will be 
adequate under COPPA.  Xanga‘s efforts to screen out users under the age of thirteen 
were deemed ineffective, and yet when Imbee attempted to create a social networking 
safe haven for children under the age of thirteen, rather than promote age falsification, its 
efforts were also condemned by the FTC.  These enactments against social networking 
sites seemingly create a double-bind: a website who fails to verify users‘ ages will be 
held liable, while a website which seeks to embrace the challenges of age-verification, 
like Imbee, will also be held liable.  Thus, the FTC‘s main enforcement actions against 
COPPA undermine confidence in the stability and predictability of its provisions rather 
than provide clear illustrations of when a violation has occurred.  
B.  Criticism & FTC Reviews  
¶46 Following the passage of COPPA legislation and the implementation of the FTC‘s 
Rule, initial reactions to the law were optimistic and COPPA was hailed as a positive step 
towards protecting children‘s privacy interests online.114  COPPA was praised for 
creating uniform legal standards for websites to adhere to and for bringing the concerns 
of children online to national attention.
115
  In 2001, one commentator went so far as to 
proclaim: ―[M]ost children's sites have discontinued their practices of using personal 
information from children for marketing, and no sites are knowingly sharing the collected 
information with third parties.‖116  
¶47 Despite the optimistic outlook for COPPA, criticism began soon after the Rule was 
enacted.  Smaller websites began to feel the increased burden of COPPA compliance, as 
separate costs were required to hire legal teams to write expansive privacy polices, and to 
enforce privacy requirements in chat rooms and message boards.
117
  Given COPPA‘s 
virtual silence on the definition of a website ―directed towards children,‖ web operators 
had to judge for themselves whether or not they should comply with COPPA, or ignore 
its regulations and risk an enforcement action.
118
  Some sites opted to cut out these 
services that could draw the attention of children, estimating that the total cost of COPPA 
compliance could reach upwards of $200,000 per year.
119
  Some consumer protection and 
business leaders questioned the true effect of the COPPA age requirement.  Jonathan 
Zuck, the president of the Association on Competitive Technology, a small business 
interest group, testified to Congress in early 2001 regarding COPPA‘s weaknesses, 
stating: ―[W]e all agree with the goal of protecting kids, but that hasn't been the net 
                                                 
114






 Wolcott, supra note 11. 
118
 Id.  The challenges for websites in interpreting ―directed towards children‖ as a statutory provision are 
highlighted even further by enforcement actions, such as those against UMG that illustrate how websites 
can be held liable for a misinterpretation of COPPA‘s language. 
119
 Wolcott, supra note 11; see also Hiller et al., supra note 54, at 442.  Initial criticisms of COPPA 
predicted that websites would close their doors to children under the age of thirteen because of the 
challenges of COPPA compliance, and the financial burden of obtaining parental consent.  Id.    
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result. . . .  Kids are just lying about their age on adult sites.  I‘m not sure that's a net 
positive.‖120 
¶48 In addition to problems of age falsification, another persistent concern was whether 
or not such regulations would serve to restrict children‘s ability to use the Internet as an 
educational and functional tool.
121
  A child‘s ability to freely explore online could be 
hampered by the need to obtain parental consent every time a website asked for personal 
information or preferences.
122
  For example, resources like homework help, live chats, 
games, and educational materials tailored to personal preferences might be removed for a 
site seeking to achieve COPPA compliance.  Conversely, websites had an incentive to 




¶49 In the Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Act, Congress requires that the FTC 
conduct regular reviews of COPPA‘s implementation and compliance.124  In 2002, the 
FTC concluded its first systematic review, finding that certain aspects of COPPA were 
initially more successful than others.
125
  According to the review, COPPA had increased 
the number of children‘s websites providing privacy policies explaining to children and 
parents whether the site collected personal information, and how such information was 
used.
126
  The FTC found that close to 90% of children‘s websites now made such policies 
available, as opposed to only 10% before COPPA‘s enactment—illustrating that the 
―notice‖ element of Fair Information Use practices had greatly improved.127  
Additionally, 45% of websites surveyed obtained a parent‘s e-mail address for purposes 
of consent, indicating a legitimate effort by websites to obtain verifiable parental consent 




¶50 In this first report, the FTC admitted the limitations of its survey, noting that while 
some violations of COPPA can be ascertained from a surface view of the website, true 
compliance is best measured though an investigation of each site‘s individual practices.129  
Additionally, the FTC‘s first review only examined the practices of websites clearly 
―directed to children,‖ but ignored websites which may not obviously target children, but 
that may nonetheless have collected personal information from children under the age of 
                                                 
120
 Wolcott, supra note 11. 
121
 See Allen, supra note 88, at 769 (noting that the burden of parental consent may hinder children‘s ability 
to fully engage in the educational and entertainment aspects of the Internet).  
122





 15 U.S.C.A. § 6506 (2006). 
125
 FTC, STAFF REPORT, PROTECTING CHILDREN‘S PRIVACY UNDER COPPA: A SURVEY ON COMPLIANCE 9 
(Apr. 2002) [hereinafter FTC COPPA ONE YEAR REPORT], available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/coppasurvey.pdf; but see Hiller et al., supra note 54, at 436 (describing that 
acceptance of verification technologies hindered the ability of COPPA to adequately protect children 
online).  
126
 FTC COPPA ONE YEAR REPORT, supra note 125, at 9. 
127
 Id.  
128
 Id. at 4.  However, the possibility remains that children might create false e-mail accounts and pretend to 
be their parents to grant consent.  See BILL CARMODY, ONLINE PROMOTIONS: WINNING STRATEGIES AND 
TACTICS 104–05 (2001).  
129
 FTC COPPA ONE YEAR REPORT, supra note 125, at 4. 





  As discussed above, the statutory language of COPPA fails to clearly define 
what constitutes a website ―directed to children.‖  By studying only websites clearly for 
children, the FTC failed to consider the data collection practices of websites in the gray 
zone where COPPA violations could still occur.   
¶51 The FTC‘s ever-changing attitude towards the ―sliding scale‖ rule illustrates the 
difference between COPPA‘s requirements in theory and in practice.  The sliding scale 
provision of COPPA was envisioned as a temporary guideline for obtaining parental 
consent until more secure electronic means were developed.
131
  However, in the years 
following the passage of COPPA, the FTC‘s hope that the sliding scale would be 
replaced with more reliable electronic means of parental consent has been unrealized.
132
   
During a 2002 survey of COPPA compliance, the FTC requested comments from website 
operators and other interested parties on the issue of extending the duration of the sliding 
scale rule.
133
  A wide range of interest groups—from advertising and marketing firms, to 
educational groups and internet services providers—took part in the comment, and 
generally all supported the extension of the sliding scale rule.
134
  AOL Time Warner, 
arguing that the sliding scale not only be extended two years, but extended indefinitely, 
wrote of verification technology: ―The promise of new digital signature technologies 
remains largely that—a promise.‖135   
¶52 Other comments focused on the cost of eliminating the use of e-mail as acceptable 
parental consent, arguing that any alternative verification systems would be too 
expensive, and observing that even for adult websites, the use of digital verification 
technology is scarce.
136
  Some commentators expressed an opposite view, worrying that 
by continuing to extend the sliding scale, organizations would not have the motivation to 
invest in technological advancements, and instead be content to rely on e-mail 
verification.
137
  The FTC agreed with the majority of comments and approved a three-
year extension of the sliding scale rule until its next review in 2005.
138
 
¶53 Three years later, age verification technology still had not advanced in the manner 
envisioned by COPPA‘s drafters.  During the required compliance review in 2005, the 
FTC concluded that COPPA was a generally successful mechanism for improving 




 See FTC Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888, 59,908 (Nov. 3, 1999) 
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132
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 Comments of AOL Time Warner et al., Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule Amendment—
Comment P994504 (Nov. 30, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/coppa2/comments/aol.htm. 
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 Letter from David Medine, Online Privacy Alliance, to Donald Clark, Secretary, FTC (Nov. 19, 2001), 
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 Letter from Rebecca Richards, TRUSTe, to Secretary, FTC (Nov. 30, 2001), available at 
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 Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,818, 18,820 (Apr. 17, 2002), available at 
2002 WL 560760 (F.R.).  
Vol. 5:2] Lauren A. Matecki 
385 
children‘s privacy online.139  However, in addressing the effectiveness of parental 
consent mechanisms, the FTC conceded that the views of most commentators were 
correct: ―[S]ecure electronic mechanisms have not developed to the point where they are 
widely available and affordable.‖140  The FTC decided to extend the sliding scale 
approach indefinitely, admitting that verification technology was still inadequate.
141
  The 
full time adoption of the sliding scale rule illustrates that the other methods of parental 
consent contemplated by COPPA (print and mail forms, faxing signatures, and telephone 
hotlines) were not viable or cost effective options.  
¶54 In 2007, the most recent review of COPPA, the FTC concluded that the Act and 
Rule were ―effective in helping protect the privacy and safety of young children 
online[,]‖ and did not recommend any changes to the core of COPPA‘s framework.142  
While remaining optimistic about the general workings of COPPA, the 2007 report did 
concede several significant weaknesses.
143
  For instance, the FTC acknowledged the 
limitation inherent in COPPA‘s application only to websites ―directed to children,‖ 
expressing concern that general audience websites may still be collecting information 
from children under the age of thirteen.
144
 
¶55 The 2007 report continued to acknowledge the lack of technology providing a 
plausible means of age verification.
145
  As one commentator noted, ―[T]here is no 
conceivable way, short of locking a child in a closet and not letting him out until 
adulthood, to absolutely prevent a child from viewing age inappropriate websites.‖146 
With respects to age verification, there is similarly no absolute way of ensuring that 
children will not lie on registration forms to certain websites.
147
  Instead, the FTC advised 
websites to check for age information ―in a way that does not bias the result,‖ such as not 
                                                 
139
 See Children‘s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,247, 13,258 (Mar. 15, 2006) 
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 Id. at 12. 
145
 Id.; see also Letter from Daniel Popeo et al., Wash. Legal Found., to Secretary, FTC 5 (June 27, 2006) 
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making it clear on a log-in page that thirteen is the permitted age and ensuring that drop 
down menus for birthdays cover all ages rather than just thirteen and up.
148
 
¶56 In 2007, the FTC recognized the challenges faced with the rise of social networking 
sites—a move which was significant, but long overdue.  Recognizing the growing 
popularity of social networking, the report states:  
While social networking websites offer the potential for online 
communication, camaraderie, and a sense of community among teens and 
tweens, they also pose substantial risks because the information that 
children post on their online journals or blogs may be accessed by other 




¶57 The FTC has additionally responded to the concerns of social networking sites by 
posting best practice educational materials on its website to inform children, teens, and 
parents of the possible privacy risks of using such sites.
150
  The FTC also emphasized that 
COPPA still applies to such websites that knowingly collect information from children 
under the age of thirteen.  The FTC highlighted the 2006 enforcement action against 




C. COPPA Today 
¶58 While the FTC praises the few, but important, benefits of COPPA, it ignores 
growing online dangers to children‘s privacy posed by social networking.  Ten years after 
COPPA‘s passage, and bearing in mind the changed landscape of the Internet among 
teens and adolescents, many critics do not share this sense of optimism.  The permanent 
extension of the sliding scale rule indicates that technological advancements have not 
evolved in the manner originally envisioned by COPPA.
152
  As such, e-mail remains the 
only viable means for parental consent, which is highly vulnerable to circumvention.
153
 
¶59 Furthermore, the line between a website ―directed towards children‖ and a general 
audience website has blurred.  One of the practical effects of COPPA has been that 
websites now often use age-screening methods to prohibit users under the age of 
                                                 
148
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practices, and even their own, technically sophisticated children.‖); see also DAN ALBAN, COMPETITIVE 
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http://cei.org/PDFs/COPA_and_Internet_Content_Regulation.pdf. 




  These screening methods are technologically ineffective, as computer-savvy 
children often know how to circumvent these attempted roadblocks.
155
  The ease of age 
falsification leads to a situation where children may share personal information on a 
website which seeks to operate outside of COPPA restrictions because it ―officially‖ 
doesn‘t allow underage users. 
¶60 The FTC has recognized the problems with age verification and the technological 
weakness of electronic parental consent.  In this view, COPPA does not operate as the 
most effective mechanism to protect children‘s online privacy rights, but rather 
encourages websites to limit the Internet resources available to young persons by 
imposing largely unenforceable age restrictions on websites.
156
  The FTC recognizes that 
the rise of social networking sites is the changing Internet landscape, but admits that 
nothing but inadequate age screening mechanisms serve to prevent children from 
registering on such sites.
157
   
¶61 When the FTC addressed the rise of social networking sites as an emerging issue, 
the Commission only skimmed the surface of the possible privacy challenges that lie 
ahead.  Given the popularity of social networking sites and their potential privacy risks, 
advocacy groups have recently begun to call for an overhaul of COPPA.  In an April 
2008 letter to the FTC, advocacy groups including the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
Children Now, and the Center for Digital Democracy called upon the FTC to expand 
privacy rights to a class they believe COPPA ignores—the thirteen to seventeen age 
demographic.
158
  Aside from COPPA, there are no other Internet-specific privacy laws, 




¶62 Before a meaningful recommendation of revisions to COPPA can be addressed, it 
is necessary to review how the collection and use of personal information online has 
changed and grown in the ten years since the FTC first addressed privacy challenges of 
children.  Specifically, it is important to discuss the privacy threats to adolescents and the 
rise of social networking sites. 
IV. CURRENT INTERNET PRIVACY CONCERNS  
A. The Use of Personal Information Online: Then & Now 
¶63 The opportunities for individuals to share personal information over the Internet 
have expanded exponentially in the years since Congress passed COPPA.  In 1997, the 
                                                 
154
 Wolcott, supra note 11. 
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 See FTC Xanga Enforcement, supra note 100 (finding Xanga‘s age screening attempts insufficient 
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FTC mostly concerned itself with the risks of children voluntarily submitting their 
personal information to website operators, chat rooms, and message boards.
160
  During 
the past thirteen years, however, website operators have significantly increased their use 
of passive methods of data collection.  More websites now use cookies or similar 
technologies to store user preferences and argue that such practices help consumers by 
making Internet use more convenient and efficient.
161
 
¶64 Today, one of the most prevalent uses of personal information online is a web 
operator‘s ability to create effective and targeted advertising.162  Online advertising has 
grown to a nearly ten billion dollar industry in recent years.
163
  By using personal 
information gathered online, marketers can effectively target audiences based on 
interests, demographics, and any other factor about a person that can be ascertained from 
web history and online behavior.
164
 
¶65 Known as ―behavioral targeting,‖ online advertisers target consumers by analyzing 
information collected through cookies, clickstream data, and voluntary information 
submission to create web advertisements that best match an individual web user‘s 
interests.
165
  This highly effective mechanism is certainly beneficial for web operators 
and advertisers, and arguably for consumers as well (individuals likely prefer marketing 
for goods and services that they have an interest in).
166
  The largest commercial 
companies online utilize behavioral targeting methods in their advertising—in 2007, 
Internet companies invested over $575 million in behavioral targeting.
167
  Some privacy 




¶66 A large percent of Americans remain largely ignorant of the extent that behavioral 
targeting occurs online.  According to as study by the Consumer Reports National 
Research Center, fifty-seven percent of Web users ―mistakenly believe that before 
monitoring their online browsing, companies are legally required to identify themselves, 
spell out why they‘re collecting data and who they intend to share it with.‖169  Sixty-one 
percent of those surveyed believe that online activities are ―private and not shared 
without their permission.‖170  Forty-three percent of users incorrectly believe that a court 
order is required to monitor Web-browsing activities.
171
  These statistics demonstrate the 
ignorance of information collection practices, not just among children and adolescents, 
but the population on the whole. 
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¶67 Internet providers and website operators argue that personal information for the use 
of behavioral targeting ads is a necessary predicate to useful, free Internet services.
172
  
Websites generate profits and cover costs of operation through such advertisements, and 
as such are able to operate such sites free of cost.
173
  Surveys have shown that consumers 
enjoy the value of the benefits of free sites (Facebook and MySpace are free to users, as 
are other interactive sites like YouTube and Wikipedia), and are willing to allow the use 
of personal information as the ―price‖ of such use.174  The flaw in this reasoning, 
however, is that consumers are unaware of the broad and sweeping control that a website 
may have over their personal information.
175
  Under ideal circumstances, Internet users of 
free websites would be fully informed of the extent to which their personal information is 
being used.  With this full knowledge would come the appropriate consent to accept this 
use as the ―price‖ of a free Internet.  Without such meaningful consent, however, 
websites are able to exploit the ignorance under a guise of ―it‘s the cost of doing 
business.‖  Bearing in mind the FTC‘s four principles of fair information use—notice, 
choice, access, and security—meaningful consent cannot be achieved without first 
providing consumers with meaningful notice. 
B. Privacy Concerns Specific to Teens 
¶68 As COPPA protections only extend to children under the age of thirteen, websites 
that are directed towards adolescents are not subject to the rigors of COPPA enforcement.  
As the FTC stated back in 1997, children do not possess the cognitive powers to 
distinguish commercial speech or possess the ability to meaningfully consent to the 
distribution and use of their personal information.
176
  A key goal of COPPA from the 
onset sought to return this power of consent to parents rather than children.
177
 
¶69 However, teenagers are vulnerable to information misuse, sometimes even more so 
than young children.  Teenagers face peer pressures to join social networking sites, and 
therefore such websites have increasingly become part of an adolescent‘s social 
identity.
178
  As such, teenagers like to interact online and share personal information 
through social networking sites.
179
  As more adolescents seek out identity formation on 
the Internet, it becomes incredibly difficult for them to resist the peer pressure to interact 
online and divulge personal information.
180
   
¶70 Additionally, adolescents are typically viewed as prone to experimentation and 
risk-taking, which makes it difficult for parents, educators, and website operators to help 
teens remain aware of the potential misuse of personal information that they share 
online.
181
  Especially with regard to behavioral targeting, commentators argue that 
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teenagers are ―less likely than adults to understand the long term consequences of sharing 
personal information online for tracking.‖182  Additionally, some argue that teens might 
be ―more susceptible to targeted advertisements that are tailored to their psychological 
weaknesses.‖183 
¶71 Furthermore, a discussion of the risks of data collection online would be 
incomplete without touching upon the many safety considerations that are raised when 
children and teens share too much of their personal life online.  The many unfortunate 
examples of teenagers manipulated into disclosing personal information to strangers 
online, and subsequently suffering harm, provide further support for frequent teenager 
ignorance of the dangers of providing personal information online.
184
  Concerns over 
sexual predators, online harassment, and cyber bullying can arise when teenagers allow 
the collection of their personal data online without regard to the possible 
consequences.
185
  While revised COPPA provisions would not even attempt to directly 
resolve all these sensitive problems, new provisions requiring more adequate notice and 
better informed consent to the dissemination of personal information may make 
adolescents more cognizant of the risks online. 
C. Illustrating the Need for Change: Facebook 
¶72 As previously mentioned, outside of COPPA regulations, the only mechanism to 
protect Internet users from misuse of personal information online is section 5 of the FTC 
regulation against ―unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.‖186  
Therefore, websites that are not ―directed towards children‖ (an ambiguous term at best) 
are not required to follow specific practices regarding the collection and dissemination of 
personal information.   
¶73 However, as the FTC‘s enforcement action against Xanga and Imbee.com prove, 
social networking websites are considered ―directed towards children‖ under the age of 
thirteen in addition to teenage and adult demographics.
187
  The ease of age falsification 
online and the vulnerabilities of children and adolescents to personal information misuse 
warrant an examination of such websites‘ privacy practices. 
¶74 Facebook‘s privacy practices provide a useful example of online networking 
practices both because of the sites immense popularity and because its practices have 
been both praised and criticized.
188
  Launched in 2004, Facebook.com has over 500 
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million active users as of August 2010.
189
  Initially limited to college users, Facebook 
eventually opened up to any users thirteen and older.
190
  Facebook is currently the second 
most popular website in the world, second only to Google.
191
  Facebook offers 
opportunities to voluntarily share personal information through user profiles.  Users on 
Facebook share a wide range of personal information, including e-mail address, interests, 
geographic location, information about acquaintances, favorite websites, music, phone 
numbers, and photographs.
192
  In fact, more than 3.5 billion pieces of content (web links, 
news stories, blog posts, notes, photo albums, etc.) are shared on Facebook each week.
193
 
¶75 Like most social networking websites, Facebook uses advertising to generate 
revenues.  According to estimates, Facebook generated $500 million in advertising 
revenues in 2009.
194
  Facebook ―Social Ads‖ target specific demographics based on the 
information in user profiles.
195
  While users on Facebook have great control as to the 
degree of personal information they wish to share with other Facebook users, Facebook‘s 
privacy mechanisms don‘t allow users control over the use of their information by 
advertisers.  Facebook does not permit users to opt-out of advertisements completely.
196
  
Such a decision may reflect the theory that the behavioral targeting methods employed by 
Facebook are part of the ―cost‖ of getting the benefits of Facebook. 
¶76 Facebook maintains a privacy policy as a component of its Terms of Service 
agreement (TOS), which seeks to give notice to users regarding such advertising 
practices.  The policy is comprehensive, and can be found by following the ―Privacy‖ 
link located on the bottom of a users‘ page.  Concerning sharing personal information, the 
policy states:  
We allow advertisers to choose the characteristics of users who will see 
their advertisements and we may use any of the non-personally 
identifiable attributes we have collected (including information you may 
have decided not to show to other users, such as your birth year or other 
sensitive personal information or preferences) to select the appropriate 
audience for those advertisements. For example, we might use your 
interest in soccer to show you ads for soccer equipment, but we do not tell 
the soccer equipment company who you are . . . .  Even though we do not 
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share your information with advertisers without your consent, when you 
click on or otherwise interact with an advertisement there is a possibility 
that the advertiser may place a cookie in your browser and note that it 
meets the criteria they selected.
197
 
¶77 The policy outlines several other instances in which Facebook may use a users‘ 




¶78 Turning first to the positive aspects of Facebook‘s privacy policy, critics have 
praised Facebook‘s statement about its privacy practices, noting that it is written in clear, 
plain English.
199
  Facebook discloses the fact that they use information in profiles to 
solicit third party advertisements, and does not attempt to hide this practice behind 
confusing legalese.
200
   
¶79 However, others note that Facebook‘s privacy policy is extremely lengthy, 
accessible only from a small link towards the bottom of the page, and thus users may not 
be likely to make the effort to seek out, fully read, or comprehend its often vaguely 
worded provisions.
201
  In 2004, a study measured the required reading levels for the top 
fifty U.S. websites‘ privacy policies, and found that the average policy required a college 
education to fully comprehend, while over half contained language ―beyond the grasp of 
56.6 percent of the Internet population.‖  
¶80 Facebook fails to straightforwardly communicate the full scope of its privacy 
policy with respect to third party advertisers.  Facebook‘s main privacy page states in 
bold print, ―We never share your personal information with our advertisers,‖ but states 
later that sharing is done but on an anonymous basis.
202
  This vague language is only 
moderately clarified in the privacy subsection found on a smaller link.  COPPA notice 
requirements mandate privacy policies be placed in a ―clear and prominent‖ place on a 
site, and include sufficient detail on how such information is used and with whom it is 
shared.
203
  Under such an analysis, Facebook would be required to detail its use of 
personal information in behavioral targeting in more detail than described in its current 
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¶81 Another key feature on Facebook is the use of Facebook Platform applications.  
Facebook Platform allows third party developers to create applications that Facebook 
users may add to their profiles to enhance their Facebook experience.
205
  Applications 
include games (e.g., Farmville or Mafia Wars), quizzes (e.g., ―Which Twilight Character 
are You?‖), entertainment (e.g., ―iLike,‖ ―Bumper Sticker,‖ ―My Year in Statuses‖) and 
many more.
206
  Facebook currently hosts over 550,000 active applications on the 
Facebook Platform.
207




¶82 Facebook‘s Platform applications are created and operated by third party 
developers.
209
  As Facebook‘s privacy policy clearly states, ―We do not own or operate 
the applications that you use through Facebook Platform (such as games and utilities).‖210  
The policy continues, ―That means that when you use those applications and websites 
you are making your Facebook information available to someone other than 
Facebook.‖211  Facebook distances itself completely from third party application and 
claims it has no control or responsibility for how third-parties use the information 
provided to them by users.  One must look beyond Facebook‘s privacy policy to learn 
more about how these third party applications might access your information.
212
  A 
separate policy about Platform applications (located in a different link, thus illustrating 
again Facebook‘s lack of straightforward notice) states, ―When you use an application, 
your content and information is shared with the application.‖213   
¶83 The range of users‘ personal information third party application developers may 
access without individual consent is vast.
214
  The privacy concerns raised by such 
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 See Facebook.com, Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, 




 ―Examples of the types of information that applications and websites may have access to include the 
following information, to the extent visible on Facebook: your name, your profile picture, your gender, 
your birthday, your hometown location (city/state/country), your current location (city/state/country), your 
political view, your activities, your interests, your musical preferences, television shows in which you are 
interested, movies in which you are interested, books in which you are interested, your favorite quotes, 
your relationship status, your dating interests, your relationship interests, your network affiliations, your 
education history, your work history, your course information, copies of photos in your photo albums, 
metadata associated with your photo albums (e.g., time of upload, album name, comments on your photos, 
etc.), the total number of messages sent and/or received by you, the total number of unread messages in 
your in-box, the total number of ―pokes‖ you have sent and/or received, the total number of wall posts on 
your Wall, a list of user IDs mapped to your friends, your social timeline, notifications that you have 
received from other applications, and events associated with your profile.‖  Facebook.com, Facebook is 
Selling your Personal Information, http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=2208625477 (last visited 
Aug. 26,  2010) (the above language is from an older version of Facebook‘s privacy policy and is found in 
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applications are serious, but not well understood.  As one commentator notes, 
―[Applications] are given access to far more personal data than they need to in order to 
run. . . .  Not only does Facebook enable this, but it does little to warn users that it is even 
happening, and of the risk that a rogue application developer can pose.‖215 
D. Facebook Privacy Controversies 
¶84 Facebook has been the subject of several high-profile privacy controversies in 
recent years.  In August 2008, Facebook user plaintiffs filed a class action suit against 
Facebook‘s Beacon ad technology (Beacon).216  Beacon ads used cookie technology to 
track a user‘s activity on outside websites, and then report this information back to 
Facebook on user profiles to advertise products or services.
217
  With the Beacon 
technology, if a user were logged into Facebook, their activities on partner websites 
would be posted on that users‘ Facebook wall (for example, if a user purchased movie 
tickets on Fandango.com a story would appear).  The suit alleged Facebook and its 
affiliates did not give users adequate notice and choice about Beacon and the collection 
and use of users‘ personal information.218  Plaintiffs and Facebook settled the suit in late 
2009.
219
  Under the settlement terms, Facebook terminated Beacon and provided $9.5 
million to establish an independent nonprofit foundation that will identify and fund 
projects and initiatives that promote the cause of online privacy, safety, and security.
220
 
¶85 In February 2009, Facebook was hit with a wave of public criticism after the 
consumer blog The Consumerist published a critical report on Facebook‘s Terms of 
Service (TOS).
221
  The report focused on a key provision in the TOS agreement granting 
Facebook an irrevocable and non-exclusive right to any and all user content.
222
  As 
summarized by the report, the provision essentially stated that ―anything you upload to 
Facebook can be used by Facebook in any way they deem fit.‖223  The Consumerist 
focused on a recent change in the policy that appeared to extend Facebook‘s right to all of 
a user‘s information indefinitely—even if the user terminated his or her account.224   
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¶86 An intense public backlash arose in the wake of the report.  Commentators across 
the Internet—from the New York Times to blogger Perez Hilton—expressed concerns 
over the seemingly limitless control Facebook was claiming to exert over users‘ personal 
information.
225
  After several prominent privacy advocacy groups threaten to file a 
complaint with the FTC, Facebook backtracked on its policy changes and agreed to 
reinstate the original policy, and asked users to help contribute to a new ―Bill of Rights 
and Responsibilities‖ to cover privacy concerns.226 
¶87 On December 9, 2009, Facebook again made headlines by announcing new privacy 
settings that promised improved simplicity and greater user control over content.
227
  
Upon logging in, all Facebook users were prompted with a pop-up message informing 
users of a new privacy page.
228
  All Facebook users were then connected to their privacy 
setting page, and given the option to either keep their old privacy settings, or to create 
new ones.
229
  The change in Facebook‘s policy was intended to raise awareness to online 
privacy concerns.  As Facebook spokesman Simon Axten stated, ―As far as we know, it‘s 
the first time in the history of the Internet that so many people have been required to 
make affirmative decisions about their privacy.‖230 
¶88 However, while the Facebook policy changes made it possible for users to exert 
more control over who can view their content, certain user information must remain 
public and visible to all users including name, profile picture, current city, networks, 
friends list, and pages.
231
  Thus, while the policy changes offer additional privacy 
controls they simultaneously limit your ability to control access to key personal 
information.  Many privacy advocates responded negatively to these changes, including 
the ACLU, Center for Digital Democracy, and Electronic Frontier Foundation.
232
  As one 
commentator notes, ―[T]he ‗privacy‘ changes are all about encouraging [users] to share 
more stuff publicly.  It‘s great that Facebook is making all users think about privacy, but 
we are concerned that the transition tool and other changes actually discourage or 
eliminate some privacy protections that Facebook users currently employ.‖233  In 
December 2009, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, along with several other 
online privacy groups, filed a formal complaint with the FTC, alleging that the new 
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privacy controls ―violate user expectations, diminish user privacy, and contradict 
Facebook's own representations.‖234  
¶89 Another serious privacy controversy emerged in spring 2010, directly involving 
Facebook‘s data collection practices and third party advertisers.  The Wall Street Journal 
reported that although Facebook claimed that it ―doesn‘t share information with 
advertisers,‖ on several occasions it shared the user name of Facebook users with 
advertisers.
235
  The direct contradiction with Facebook‘s privacy policy has caused 
politicians to call for regulatory action and caused over a dozen privacy groups to file 
complaints with the FTC for deceptive trade practices.
236
  The controversy caused 
Facebook to yet again publicly promise to review its privacy policies, yet the spring 2010 
incident has caused Facebook users themselves to react strongly to the violation of 
trust.
237
  The website QuitFacebookDay.com was launched urging Facebook users ―sick 
of Facebook‘s lack of respect for . . . data‖ to quit the site once and for all.238  While 
Facebook has promised to roll out new controls in response to the controversy, it is 
unclear how if at all these controls will related to a user‘s ability to control third party 
access to their personal data.
239
 
¶90 A final—although less public—controversy surrounding Facebook is the growing 
number of users under the age of thirteen, in direct violation of COPPA‘s provisions.  
Statistics as to underage Facebook usage are difficult to come by given the ease of age 
falsification on Facebook.
240
  A study in the United Kingdom found that more than a 
quarter of eight to eleven year olds online have a profile on a social networking 
website.
241
  Another study found that a quarter of children ages eight to twelve have a 
social networking profile on Facebook, Bebo, or Myspace.
242
  It is clear that privacy 
concerns on Facebook extend beyond just teens to children COPPA set out to protect.  
¶91 With the provisions of COPPA in mind, the string of recent Facebook controversies 
illustrate two important points.  First, the typical Facebook user remains largely ignorant 
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of his or her privacy rights.  For instance, many of the offending provisions at issue in the 
report and subsequent response have always been in the Facebook TOS—it took the 
report from The Consumerist and the third party privacy breach of spring 2010 to shed 
light on these vague provisions.  Notice and consent under Facebook‘s current policy 
fails to adequately inform users of their rights.  The recent ―Quit Facebook‖ campaign 
demonstrates that users have not fully comprehended their rights under the current 
policies, and that change is needed to more effectively communicate Facebook‘s policies 
to its users.  
¶92 Secondly, the controversies are important because they foster an open discussion of 
online privacy concerns.
243
  Facebook users—including millions of adolescents and even 
children—are increasingly mindful of the power and control Facebook and third parties 
have over their personal information.  As such, there exists today a valuable opportunity 
for Congress to consider revisions to its online privacy policies. 
V. A NEW CHILDREN‘S ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT 
A. Suggestions from Advocacy Groups and Critics 
¶93 COPPA is in need of reform due to the changing Internet landscape and the threats 
posed to children and adolescents online.  While Facebook‘s practices affect all its users, 
not just children and teens, framing the issue through the lens of Facebook‘s most 
vulnerable users is likely to create a stronger incentive to meaningful change.  Legislators 
must strike a balance between the need to protect the private information of children and 
teens and the need to permit social networking sites to continue to use a legitimate 
business model which relies on advertising revenues to support their products.  While the 
original objective of COPPA intended for parents and website operators to share the 
burden of protecting children‘s information online, this goal has not been met due to the 
ease of age falsification and the absence of an effective means for granting parental 
consent.  A higher burden must be placed on web operators themselves to fulfill the 
principles of fair information use—better notice, clearer consent, and easier access to 
information policies and security.   
¶94 In April 2008, several consumer and privacy advocacy groups called upon the FTC 
to consider revisions to COPPA.  These proposals addressed the challenges of targeted 
marketing efforts and criticized COPPA regulations as an ineffective means of ensuring 
the protection of personal information online.
244
  Organizations called upon the FTC to 
create a special task force to examine new threats to children and teenagers, including the 
role of behavioral targeting and profiling and to open up an inquiry into the data 
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¶95  Some commentators have suggested that an overhaul of COPPA that eliminates 
age distinctions and parental consent requirements would be the most effective means of 
revision, arguing instead for a new policy that places a higher burden on the website 
operators themselves to regulate the use of personal information.
246
  These advocates 
have called on the FTC or Congress to eliminate parental consent entirely and require 
website operators to obtain consent directly from the individual whose information is 
being collected.
247
  However, while a revision to COPPA eliminating all age barriers 
would address the problematic concept of parental consent, it ignores the particular 
vulnerabilities of children and adolescents and, as such, would push aside the original 
legislative intent of COPPA regulations. 
¶96 In 2008, a Canadian public interest group charged Facebook with several violations 
of Canadian privacy laws.
248
  According to the complaint, Facebook fails to identify all 
the purposes for which it collects users‘ personal information, fails to obtain informed 
consent from users regarding the dissemination of their personal information to third 
parties, fails to disclose its advertisers‘ use of personal information and the level of users‘ 
control over their privacy settings, and fails to provide adequate notice regarding the 
range of personal information that is disclosed to third party advertisers and application 
developers.
249
  Canada‘s approach suggests that revised privacy laws should include 
stricter notice and consent requirements, with stronger emphasis on disclosure of all third 
parties with access to an individual‘s personal information.  The complaint is even more 




¶97 Another proposed change to COPPA would require mandatory opt-in policies.251  
Websites with an ―opt-out‖ mechanism require users to take an affirmative step to protect 
personal information; for example, checking ―accept‖ to a statement allowing for the 
disclosure of private information to third parties.
252
  Opt-in policies, on the contrary, 
mandate that as a default option, personal information cannot be shared or disseminated 
with third parties unless a user affirmatively grants permission.
253
  For example, a 
Facebook user wishing to share their personal information for the purposes of advertising 
would have to affirmatively agree to such use via a consent agreement.  In a recent forum 
on behavioral targeting, FTC Commissioner John Leibowitz expressed his support for 
these policies, stating that ―[t]he current ‗don't ask, don't tell‘ in online tracking and 
profiling has to end.‖254  In the wake of the spring 2010 Facebook controversy, consumer 
groups have advocated an opt-in model with minimal data collection, in particular given 
the use of Facebook by children and teens.
255
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¶98 However, a mandatory shift to opt-in only information sharing would likely be 
heavily opposed by Facebook and other social networking websites.  Facebook creator 
Marc Zuckerberg has recently commented that an ―opt‖ policy defeats the purposes of 
Facebook—the sharing of information with others.256  Speaking directly to opt-in 
policies, Zuckerburg noted, ―people use [Facebook] because they love sharing 
information.‖257  Further, blanket opt-in policies are an unnecessary step if Facebook 
were to provide meaningful notice and consent to its users in the first place.  As noted 
above, Internet providers argue that, from a policy perspective, consent to some data 
sharing with advertisers is the implicit cost to a free Internet.
258
  If a website is providing 
adequate notice to its users of its information practices, then users can decide whether or 
not to continue using that website.  As the ―Quit Facebook‖ campaign demonstrates, 
users are willing to turn away from the site when educated with the full extent of data 
practices.
259
  Therefore, regulations should focus on ways to equip vulnerable Internet 
users—children and teens—with the information necessary to make this determination. 
B. Recommended Changes 
¶99 Judge Frank Easterbrook‘s earlier quoted comment on internet law can help guide 
the reform of COPPA: ―Let us not struggle to match an imperfect legal system to an 
evolving world . . . .  Let us do what is essential to permit the participants in this evolving 
world to make their own decisions.‖260  Revisions to legislation that seek to regulate the 
Internet must provide users themselves with the tools to make informed, complete 
decisions with regard to their privacy rights online. 
¶100 Policy makers charged with amending COPPA legislation should consider the 
following three revisions: (1) extending protections to adolescents ages thirteen to 
seventeen; (2) increasing opt-in information sharing policies in lieu of parental consent; 
and (3) providing more comprehensive notice and consent requirements consistent with 
principles of fair information use. 
¶101 When considering the following arguments, bear in mind the challenges of drafting 
effective legislation to regulate the Internet, especially given its expansive nature.  These 
recommendations should serve as a starting point for continued discussion as policy 
makers continue to seek the most effective solutions to protect the privacy of children and 
adolescents online. 
1. Extending Protections to Teens 
¶102 While the FTC argues that children under the age of thirteen are particularly 
vulnerable and in need of special protections online, the expanded abuse of young 
people‘s personal information, along with other dangers from over-sharing online since 
COPPA‘s enactment, have proven that such vulnerabilities are not limited to young 
people under thirteen.  Given the social pressures teens face to interact online, and the 
prevalence of social networking sites as a means of communication, it is no longer 
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¶103 Teenagers, like children, may not be able to grant meaningful consent to the use of 
their personal information online under the current framework.  When COPPA created 
protections only to users under the age of thirteen, website operators adopted age 
screening mechanisms to purportedly ban underage users from their sites.  The practical 
effect of this measure caused smaller websites to reduce services offered to children and 
encouraged age falsification.  Thus, a revision to COPPA should seek to address the 
underlying issue of fair information collection and use, rather than impose ineffective and 
unenforceable age restrictions. 
2. Limited Opt-In Requirements  
¶104 The parental consent requirement has never functioned in the manner envisioned by 
the drafters of COPPA.  In implementing COPPA, the FTC argued for measures that 
would return parents to their traditional role as gatekeepers of what information children 
access and what information others access about their children.
262
  The FTC sought to 
meet this objective by requiring websites to obtain parental consent.  However, 
technological advancements to verify parental consent have remained largely ineffective, 
and given their practical and economic impracticability, it is difficult to believe that 
consent methods like faxing in signatures or age verification hotlines are the best 
solution.  Identifiers such as social security or driver‘s license numbers could be used to 
verify age; however, the issue then becomes whether or not these extra verification 
measures pose an even greater risk to privacy, as websites would then be required to 




¶105 In lieu of the parental consent requirement, policy makers should consider adopting 
a balancing test between opt-in requirements and age.  Blanket opt-in policies for all 
Internet users, as argued above, are unlikely to find policy support and are unnecessary 
for non-children and teen users where consent is possible.  Under a balancing test, 
however, the degree to which e-advertisers and web operators could share a users‘ 
personal information would relate to that child or teen‘s stated age.  For example, 
children under the age of thirteen would have mandatory opt-in policies (no information 
can be shared with advertisers without the user explicitly agreeing), and users over 
eighteen would have default opt-out policies (information shared with advertisers 
automatically unless the user expresses otherwise), with varying degrees of information 
sharing permitted within the teenage demographic.  Further, such a rule might actually 
promote honest age representations when using Facebook, as children and teen users 
would not have to lie to gain access to the website and would be afforded more distinct 
opportunities for privacy than those over eighteen.  On Facebook, opt-in policies could be 
mandatory with regard to third party applications.  Using such a rule, regulators could 
seek a balance between the interests of e-advertisers and web operators and the privacy 
needs of children and adolescents. 
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3. Improving Notice & Consent 
¶106 In order for an limited opt-in/opt-out system to function properly, the new COPPA 
policy must impose a burden upon websites to require more comprehensive notice and 
consent procedures.  Rather than demanding ―verifiable parental consent,‖ policy makers 
could revise COPPA to include a new consent requirement applicable to both children 
and adolescents who share personal information online.  Such a policy would require the 
recognition by policy makers that children and teens‘ ability to consent differs from 
adults.  Rather than trying to bypass these age groups by faulty parental consent 
mechanisms, such a reform would require websites to educate children and teens directly.  
For example, a new COPPA could require ―informed notice and consent in a manner that 
ensures maximum possible comprehension before any collection, use and/or disclosure of 
personal information.‖264 
¶107 The methods for ensuring ―maximum possible comprehension‖ would place the 
burden of fair information practices to the websites themselves, and encourage creative 
and effective solutions for educating children and teens about sharing information online.  
Under this standard, the FTC would focus enforcement actions against websites 
providing inadequate forms of notice and consent, and against websites failing to provide 
any form of notice and consent.  Websites would adopt baseline notice and consent 
mechanisms and procedures based on whether or not they are directed towards young 
children, adolescents, or both. 
¶108 For very young Internet users, such as a four-year-old child who visits the website 
NickJr.com to play games, informed notice and consent to the sharing of personal 
information may be limited given developmental capacities.  Website operators would be 
encouraged to adopt creative mechanisms to teach children about privacy online (such as 
playing a video of a popular cartoon character talking to kids about giving their e-mail to 
strangers online) in order to provide proper notice of risks online.  Under the language 
proposed above, such methods would be targeted to ensure ―maximum possible 
comprehension‖ among younger Internet users (rather than placing the burden on parents 




¶109 For the seventeen-year-old Facebook user, maximum possible comprehension of 
notice and consent could take on a different form.  Currently, when a user registers on 
Facebook, they consent to all terms and policies automatically by simply signing up.
266
  
Rather, Facebook could use progressive click through agreements to educate users about 
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its information use policies in a clear and straightforward matter.
267
  Users would not be 
able to register until clicking through several pages of privacy rights materials.  In order 
to comply with ―maximum possible comprehension,‖ Facebook would be required to 
disclose all third party advertisers with whom they share information, and clearly outline 
Facebook‘s rights to users‘ personal information.  Similarly, Facebook could require 
users to watch an online video explaining Facebook‘s information use procedures before 
allowing registration.  These creative solutions would foster ―maximum possible 
comprehension‖ of users‘ rights, and ensure proper notice and consent to usage terms 
among all users, but especially the vulnerable children and teen demographics. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶110 While COPPA legislation was originally intended to better protect the privacy 
interests of children online, its practical effect has been to hamper children‘s access to 
certain online resources, and encourage age falsification.  COPPA legislation, despite 
only having been in effect for eleven years, is already outdated.  Congress and the FTC 
should act to revise COPPA to include teenagers and to require opt-in policies and stricter 
notice and consent requirements.  As the recent high-profile privacy controversies 
surround Facebook suggest, privacy concerns on social networking sites, especially with 
regard to teenagers, are sure to dominate privacy law debates for years to come.  As the 
Internet by its nature is a fluid, dynamic, and ever-changing medium, new COPPA laws 
are needed to provide flexible, yet comprehensive, regulations to guarantee that the 
privacy and safety of children and adolescents are protected now and in the future. 
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